"3-3-3 at Issus!" is probably one of the best-known mnemonic devices when it comes to historical dates, which even those less interested in history are likely to have heard. But what happened at Issus in 333 BC?
In order to answer this question, a few words must first be said briefly about the (historical) context of the event: Macedonia in 336 BC, the just twenty-year-old Alexander, son of King Philip II, ascends the Macedonian royal throne as Alexander III after the latter's assassination. After securing his power and suppressing several revolts in 336/335 BC, the ambitious young king finally turned his attention to the East and the Persian Empire there. Like his father Philip II before him or other Greek rulers, his declared aim was to take revenge for the events of the Persian Wars and to liberate the Greek cities of Ionia from Persian rule; although in the case of the two Macedonian kings, other and more self-serving power-political interests may also have served as a background. He set out at the beginning of 334 BC with a Greek-Macedonian army of around 30,000 foot soldiers and 5,000 cavalry and crossed the Hellespont into Asia Minor in March at the same point where the Persians had launched their (failed) invasion of Greece. In a series of spectacular military successes, Alexander quickly conquered large parts of Asia Minor and in November 333 BC met his opponent, the Persian Great King Darius III, for the first time in direct confrontation in Cilicia near the city of Issus (in southern Turkey). This brings us to the actual subject of this text, the second of the three decisive battles in the campaign against the Persian Empire, the Battle of Issus in 333 BC (the first battle was at Granikos in 334 BC and the third battle was at Gaugamela in 331 BC). The Battle of Issus forms an important link here: If it is both the continuation and the enhancement of the military success of the first battle, it is at the same time also the decisive turning point that ultimately creates the conditions for Alexander's final blow against Darius.
In the run-up to this battle, Alexander and Darius had passed each other due to the bad weather prevailing at the time and the hurried advance of both armies. When he realized this, Alexander turned back and they finally met at Issus. However, this left him in a basic situation that could not have been more disadvantageous for him: The deployment alignment of both armies was reversed, leaving Alexander cut off from his supply routes and with his back to the enemy-controlled hinterland. His own fate, that of his army and that of the rest of the campaign therefore largely depended on a positive outcome of the battle - if he had suffered a defeat here, he would have lost far more than just one battle.
According to ancient sources, the size of the Persian army was enormous. Various ancient authors cite figures of several hundred thousand men; Plutarch or Arrian even describe an alleged army strength of 500,000 to 600,000 men, which Darius is said to have led into battle (including 30,000 Greek mercenary hoplites alone). With these numbers, Darius' mercenaries alone would have been numerically superior or on a par with Alexander's army, which "only" numbered between 25,000 and 35,000 soldiers. As these figures, at least on the Persian side, are probably to be regarded as a retrospective and propagandistic exaggeration on the part of the Macedonians, not least because of the logistical and supply difficulties of such a force, modern research assumes a figure of 'only' around 100,000 - but this would still have been a 3:1 ratio of forces to Alexander's disadvantage.
However, Alexander continued his earlier successes and (also) defeated this numerically far superior army. One reason for this could have been the geographical conditions of the battlefield. It was naturally limited on both sides: On one side was the Mediterranean Sea (the Gulf of İskenderun), on the other the foot of the Amanos Mountains (today's Nur Mountains). This very narrow passage made it impossible for either side to carry out major tactical maneuvers and stab the enemy in the back. It was simply impossible for Darius to use his numerical superiority effectively against Alexander. When the Macedonians opened the actual battle and crossed the River Pindar between the two armies, Alexander and his cavalry initially repulsed the Persians on the right flank. At the same time, however, a gap formed in their ranks in the center of the battlefield. The Persians, who initially exploited this gap and inflicted heavy damage on their enemies, were repulsed by Alexander's intervention. As the Persian center now fell into disarray and his army came under pressure on both the left and right sides of the battle, the great king fled the battlefield, thus sealing the defeat of his troops, which was by no means certain at this point: Darius' troops, thus demoralized, retreated but were largely routed due to the terrain - the main force of the Great King was thus destroyed and the Persian Empire was open to Alexander.
Depending on the source or historian, there are different justifications for this victory, but whether luck, skill or both, the victory was an enormous success for Alexander and, according to the Greek narrative, the early flight caused irreparable damage to Darius' image. Asia Minor now belonged to Alexander for good and the rest of the Persian Empire was soon to follow...
Patrick Kösters
Image: AI-generated
Literature and sources used:
Müller, Konrad / Schönfeld, Herbert (ed. and transl.): Q. Curtius Rufus. History. Alexander the Great. Latin and German, Munich 1954.
Wirth, Gerhard / von Hinüber, Oskar (ed. and transl.): Arrian. The Alexander campaign and Indian history. Greek and German, Munich / Zurich 1985.
Ziegler, Konrad / Wuhrmann, Walter (ed. and transl.): Plutarch. Five double biographies. Part 1: Alexandros and Caesar. Aristeides and Marcus Cato. Pericles and Fabius Maximus. Part 2: Gaius Marius and Alcibiades. Demosthenes and Cicero. Appendix. Greek and German, Düsseldorf / Zurich 20012.
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Demandt, Alexander: Alexander the Great - Life and Legend, Munich 2009.
Lane Fox, Robin: Alexander the Great. Conqueror of the World, Hamburg 20132.
Seibert, Jakob: "Panhellenic crusade", national war, campaign of revenge or Macedonian war of conquest? Reflections on the causes of the war against Persia, in: Wolfgang Will (ed.): Alexander der Große. A world conquest and its background. Lectures of the International Alexander Colloquium in Bonn. December 19-21, 1996, Bonn 1998, pp. 5 - 58.
Wiemer, Hans-Ulrich: Alexander the Great, 2nd, newly revised edition, Munich 2015.
