Information for students

General information:

Do we have free will? If so, what kind of free will is required for moral responsibility, for praising and blaming people for what they have done? If not, what does that entail for moral responsibility and for our practice of praising and blaming people? Possible topics include, for example, classic and contemporary debates about free will, including whether determinism threatens our ability to act freely, different traditional accounts, such as compatibilism, libertarianism, and hard determinism, and how they respond to challenges from neuroscience and psychology.

A philosophical/empirical thesis on folk intuitions on free will has already been designed and can be completed as part of a Master’s thesis by conducting and evaluating online surveys (if interested, contact Sven Walter or Uwe Meyer).

Exploratory readings:

Walter, S. (2014). Willusionism, epiphenomenalism, and the feeling of conscious will. Synthese, 191, 2215–2238. doi.org/10.1007/s11229-013-0393-y

General information:

Situated cognition challenges the traditional view that cognitive processes happen solely in the brain, arguing that they (at least sometimes) include the (rest of the) body and the agent’s natural, social, and technological environment. Possible topics include how external tools and cultural practices shape cognitive abilities, whether and how cognition can be distributed across individuals and artifacts, and how situated approaches contrast with classical computational models of the mind.

Exploratory readings:

Walter, S. (2014). Situated cognition: A field guide to some open conceptual and ontological issues. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 5, 241–263.  https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-013-0167-y

Walter, S., & Kästner, L. (2012). The where and what of cognition: The untenability of cognitive agnosticism and the limits of the Motley Crew Argument. Cognitive Systems Research, 13(1), 12–23.  https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2010.10.001

Walter, S. (2010). Cognitive extension: the parity argument, functionalism, and the mark of the cognitive. Synthese, 177, 285-300.  https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-010-9844-x

General information:

Whereas emotions, and affective states in general, are often seen as purely internal states, situated affectivity explores how emotions are shaped by external structures, social interactions, and environmental affordances, so-called “scaffolds.” This area of research connects the philosophy of mind with phenomenology, affect theory, and cognitive science. Possible topics include how objects, spaces, and rituals scaffold emotions, whether affective states extend beyond the individual, how cultural practices and technological resources shape emotional experiences, and the role of power and social structures in shaping emotional norms and possibilities.

Exploratory readings:

Mossner, C., & Walter, S. (2025). Scaffolded affective harm: What is it and (how) can we do something about it? Topoi.  https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-024-10136-6

Mossner, C., & Walter, S. (2024). Shaping social media minds: Scaffolding empathy in digitally mediated interactions? Topoi 43, 645–658 (2024).  https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-024-10034-x

Bajwa, M. J., von Maur, I., & Stephan, A. (2023). Colorism in the Indian subcontinent—insights through situated affectivity. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.  https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-023-09901-6

Coninx, S., & Stephan, A. (2021) A taxonomy of environmentally scaffolded affectivity. Danish Yearbook of Philosophy, 54(1), 38–64.  https://doi.org/10.1163/24689300-bja10019

Walter, S., & Stephan, A. (2023). Situated affectivity and mind shaping: Lessons from social psychology. Emotion Review, 15(1), 3–16.  https://doi.org/10.1177/17540739221112419

Stephan, A., Walter, S., & Wilutzky, W. (2014). Emotions beyond brain and body. Philosophical Psychology, 27(1), 65–81.  https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2013.828376

General information:

Affective injustice is a topic situated at the intersection of philosophy of emotion, ethics, and social epistemology and investigates how individuals or groups are wronged specifically in their capacity as affective beings, e.g., through the misrecognition, dismissal, or distortion of their emotional experiences. Affective injustice is particularly relevant in contexts where certain emotions or affective orientations are devalued or rendered unintelligible within dominant social and cultural frameworks. Possible topics include the relationship to Miranda Fricker’s notion of epistemic injustice, the ways in which marginalized groups experience affective injustice in their emotional lives, the question whether emotions are a source of knowledge, and the ethical and political implications of recognizing affective injustice as a distinct form of injustice?

Exploratory readings:

Pismenny, A., Eickers, G. & Prinz, J., (2024) “Emotional Injustice”, Ergo an Open Access Journal of Philosophy 11: 6. doi:  https://doi.org/10.3998/ergo.5711

Gallegos, F. (2023). Introduction: Affective Injustice. Philosophical Topics, 51(1), 1–6.  https://www.jstor.org/stable/48776801

General information:

How do mental states relate to physical processes? This longstanding philosophical issue has led to various theories, including dualism, physicalism, panpsychism, and neutral monism that also engage with findings from neuroscience and cognitive science, raising, among other things, questions about the nature of consciousness and the so-called “explanatory gap” that is supposed to exist between subjective experiences and their third-person accounts in purely physical, scientific, terms. Possible research topics include the strengths and weaknesses of different theories of the mind-body-relationship, whether phenomenal consciousness can be fully explained in physicalist terms, how intentionality (the mind’s capacity to represent the world) fits into a naturalistic framework, the potential for artificial intelligence to exhibit genuine thought or self-awareness, and whether machine consciousness is possible.

Exploratory readings:

Chalmers, D. (1996): The Conscious Mind. In Search for a Fundamental Theory. Oxford University Press.

Kim, J. (2005): Physicalism, or something near enough. Princeton University Press.

Stoljar, D. (2010): Physicalism. Routledge.

Goff, P. (2019): Galileo's Error. Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness. Pantheon Press.

General information:

What does it mean to have control over one's desires and actions? Philosophical debates on self-control address its relationship to rationality, autonomy, and moral responsibility. This topic can explore historical perspectives (e.g., Stoic and Aristotelian views on self-mastery) as well as contemporary discussions on weakness of the will and the role of cognitive scaffolding in maintaining self-control. Research can also engage with empirical studies on willpower, habit formation, and the impact of external structures on decision-making.

General information:

People are naturally inclined to approach pleasurable stimuli and avoid negative ones. But why is that so, and what does this mean for moral and practical reasoning? Research in this area examines the philosophical implications of approach-avoidance biases, drawing on research in psychology and cognitive science. Possible topics include how such biases influence moral decision-making, how they relate to social cognition and whether and if so which training techniques or interventions can modify these biases.

Exploratory readings:

Solzbacher, J., König, P., & Walter, S. (2025). Embodying ‘good’ and ‘bad’: The emergent bodily meaning of approach- and avoidance-behavior. Philosophical Psychology.  https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2025.2466646

Grasso-Cladera, A., Madrid-Carvajal, J., Walter, S., & König, P. (2025). Approach–avoidance bias in virtual and real-world simulations: Insights from a systematic review of experimental setups. Brain Sciences, 25, 103.  https://doi.org/10.3390/brainsci15020103

Solzbacher, J., Czeszumski, A., Walter, S., & König, P. (2022). Evidence for the embodiment of the automatic approach bias. Frontiers in Psychology, 13, 797122.  https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2022.797122

General information:

Feminist philosophy critically examines gender, power, and social (in)justice, investigating how social structures, norms, and institutions shape experiences and opportunities differently across genders. It draws from diverse schools such as liberal feminism, which focuses on individual rights and equality; radical feminism, which critiques patriarchy as a fundamental system of oppression; and intersectional feminism, which emphasizes how gender interacts with race, class, disability, and other axes of identity. Possible topics include the nature of gender and its relationship to identity, feminist challenges to traditional philosophical assumptions in epistemology, ethics, and political theory, issues such as epistemic injustice, the role of emotions in political resistance, and how feminist philosophy intersects with contemporary debates on race, disability, and sexuality.

General information:

“Asexuality” serves as an umbrella term for a spectrum of sexual orientations of individuals whose common point of identification is the experience of a sustained or near-total lack of sexual attraction to others, whether lifelong or occasional. Asexuality challenges dominant assumptions about sexuality, attraction, and romantic norms. Possible topics include the conceptualization of asexuality in different cultural contexts, its implications for theories of sexual normativity, whether asexuality is best understood as a sexual orientation, how it fits into broader discussions of amatonormativity, and what affective injustices asexual individuals face in a society where sexuality is hegemonic.

General information:

Polyamory is the practice of engaging in multiple consensual and emotionally significant romantic or sexual relationships at the same time, challenging the widespread assumption that love and commitment must be exclusive to a single partner. Unlike casual non-monogamy, polyamory emphasizes honesty, communication, and ethical relationship structures, raising fundamental philosophical questions about the nature of love, intimacy, and personal autonomy. Possible topics include how polyamory challenges traditional views of romantic exclusivity, what virtues or ethical frameworks are needed to sustain non-monogamous relationships, polyamory’s implications for theories of love, personal identity, and social justice, and how different ethical theories (e.g., deontology, virtue ethics, care ethics) assess polyamorous relationships.

Exploratory readings:

Yuen, H.S., Zörlein, L. & Walter, S. (2024). It is not just ‘the opposite of jealousy’: a Buddhist perspective on the emotion of compersion in consensually non-monogamous relationships. Asian Journal of Philosophy, 3, 40.  https://doi.org/10.1007/s44204-024-00171-w

General information:

Trans philosophy deals with the history, lived realities, knowledge production and politics of trans people. In thinking with and through trans realities, trans philosophy also questions and expands traditional questions of philosophy (e.g., questions of epistemology, philosophy of mind, ontology, identity, etc.) and generates new questions. Queer theory further challenges normative assumptions about gender and sexuality, highlighting the fluidity of identities and the ways in which cis- and heteronormativity operates. Possible topics include the nature of queerness and transness, trans and queer philosophy of mind and emotion, queer or trans epistemologies, queer or trans phenomenology, and explorations of intersections with race, class, disability.

Exploratory readings:

Zurn, P. (2024). "Trans Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2024 Edition), Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman (eds.),  https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/trans/

Introduction to Queer Theory:  https://guides.libraries.indiana.edu/c.php?g=995240&p=8361766

General information:

Social cognition and interaction is central to our everyday lives and to our moving around in society. It asks: (How) Do we understand other people? (How) Do we attribute mental states? How do we make sense of an interaction in the bakery, or a difficult conversation with family members? Philosophical and psychological theories of social interaction and cognition used to focus quite narrowly on the attribution of mental states, ignoring social norms and social context. Slowly, the debate is opening up to new theoretical possibilities: pluralistic approaches to social interaction, taking social norms, scripts, stereotypes, and biases into account. This area of research connects cognitive science, philosophy of mind, social philosophy, sociology, psychology.

Exploratory readings:

Schlicht, Tobias (2023). Philosophy of Social Cognition. Palgrave.  https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-031-14491-2

Eickers, Gen (2025). Scripts and Social Cognition: How We Interact with Others. Routledge.  https://www.routledge.com/Scripts-and-Social-Cognition-How-We-Interact-with-Others/Eickers/p/book/9781032772585

General information:

The philosophy of social media explores how knowledge is constructed and transmitted on social media, what agency means on social media, and how sociality works on social media. This area of research connects social & moral epistemology, social ontology, social media technologies and their role in social life, human sociality in social media, and philosophical accounts of digital technology. Possible topics include echo chambers, fake news, online civility and cancel culture, online authenticity and self-construction, belonging on social media.

Exploratory readings:

Eickers, G. (2024). Social Media Experiences of LGBTQ+ People: Enabling Feelings of Belonging. Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy, 43, 617–630.  https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-023-09994-3

Frost-Arnold, K. (2023). Who Should We Be Online?: A Social Epistemology for the Internet. Oxford University Press.

Gelfert, A. (2018). Fake news: a definition. Informal Logic, 38(1), 84-117.  https://doi.org/10.22329/il.v38i1.5068

Nguyen, C. T. (2020). Echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Episteme, 17(2), 141-161.  https://doi.org/10.1017/epi.2018.32

Osler, Lucy (2020). Feeling togetherness online: a phenomenological sketch of online communal experiences. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (3):569-588.  https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-019-09627-4

General information:

A central question in the philosophy of science is what scientific explanations are, and what the conditions are for an explanation to be a good explanation. Since the late 1990s, the New Mechanist Framework of scientific explanations has raised a lot of attention, especially in the philosophy of the life sciences, such as cognitive science, neuroscience, and similar fields. Possible topics include inquiries regarding different accounts of mechanistic explanation, the role of causation in mechanisms, the role of laws of nature, or applications of the mechanistic framework to particular areas of cognitive science, such as cognitive neuroscience or computational models of cognition.

Exploratory readings:

Bechtel, W. & Richardson, R. (2010) [1993]. Discovering Complexity. Decomposition and Localization as Strategies in Scientific Research. MIT Press.

Craver, C. (2007). Explaining the Brain. Mechanisms and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience. Oxford University Press.

Glennan, S. (1996). Mechanisms and the Nature of Causation. Erkenntnis 44 (1), 49-71.

Glennan, S. (2017). The New Mechanical Philosophy. Oxford University Press.

Illari, P. & Williamson, J. (2012). What is a Mechanism? Thinking about Mechanisms Across the Sciences. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2, 119-135.

Kaiser, M. I. (2018). The Components and Boundaries of Mechanisms. In: Glennan, S. & Illari, P. (eds.). The Routledge Handbook of Mechanisms and Mechanical Philosophy. Routledge, 116-130.

Kaiser, M. I. & Krickel, B. (2017). The Metaphysics of Constitutive Mechanistic Phenomena. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68, 745-779.

Krickel, B. (2018). The Mechanical World – The Metaphysical Commitments of the New Mechanistic Approach. Springer.

Machamer, P., Darden, L., & Craver, C. (2000). Thinking about Mechanisms. Philosophy of Science 67 (1), 1-25.

General information:

The problem of mental causation concerns how mental states can be causally efficacious in a physical world. In a nutshell, the basic problem is the following: On the one hand, it seems quite plausible to think that every physical effect that has a (sufficient) cause at all has a (sufficient) physical cause: the Principle of the "Causal Closure of the Physical". On the other hand, we have the intuition that mental states sometimes cause physical effects (our being in pain, say, makes us wince; our belief that we can get groceries at the store and our desire to get some groceries causes us to walk to the store). This can both be true, however, only if either mental states (like our being in pain; our beliefs and desires) are in fact purely physical states or else some effects (like our wincing) are overdetermined by having two causes, a physical and a mental one). Since both options have seemed unpalatable to many philosophers, it is not clear how to account for the mind’s potential to change the course of the physical world. Possible topics include, for example, an investigation of whether and how mental states or events can bring about physical effects without violating the causal closure of the physical domain, of emergentist or panpsychist attempts at solving the problem, or of whether so-called interventionist theories of causation offer a viable solution to the exclusion argument.

Exploratory readings:

Kim, J. (2005): Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. Princeton University Press.

Bennett, K. (2007): Mental Causation. Philosophy Compass 2 (2), 316-337.  https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00063.x

Yoo, J. (n.d.). Mental causation. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  https://iep.utm.edu/mental-c/

General Information:

Basically, when you think about ethics, you can do so in three dimensions: You can be interested in very concrete and "applied" questions: Should animal testing be allowed (and under what conditions)? What moral problems may be related to the use of Large Language Models like ChatGPT? What rules should be in force for military drones? Is it a problem that artificial intelligence is outperforming humans in more and more areas? What moral rules should apply to computer games? What moral questions arise when using AI in medicine? This is the realm of applied ethics. At a more abstract level, you can ask yourself what basic moral principles are valid. Is it true that we should always seek the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people, as (some form of) utilitarianism would have it? Or is the criterion for moral action that its "maxims" could be a general law ("What would happen if everyone acted in this way?")? Should ethics be based on rules at all, or are virtue ethics more plausible? This is the field of normative ethics. Of course, applied ethics is not independent of the choices you make in this area.

Finally, there is metaethics. This is where you ask questions like these: It seems that people disagree about a whole range of moral issues - from concrete cases like animal testing to abstract problems like the right basic moral principles. How can we make sense of this? Are there moral facts to which we can refer? What sort of facts would they be? Can moral statements be true or false? Or are moral judgments rather expressions of subjective feelings? Is "You were wrong to lie to me" the same as "You lied to me", said with emotional disapproval?

Can we be relativists, so that everyone should act according to the moral principles they find plausible? Would this mean that we cannot argue against someone whose principles make lying no problem at all?

Exploratory readings:

Applied Ethics:

Especially for Cognitive Science, you find a range of interesting topics in:

Ethics and Information Technology (https://link.springer.com/journal/10676)

and Philosophy & Technology,  https://link.springer.com/journal/13347

Metaethics:

Andrew Fisher (2014), Metaethics. An Introduction. Routledge.

General Information: Intuitively, we make a clear distinction between a leaf falling from a tree and a person jumping down from a tree. The first is a simple event, the second an action. But what is the difference between the two? The question of how to conceptualize actions as opposed to mere events is remarkably difficult and controversial.

Actions obviously (at least usually) involve intentions; do these intentions, perhaps together with beliefs, cause the actions, just as the wind causes leaves to fall? What then is the role of the subject who performs the action? Is the subject more than the place where causal relations between intentions and actions take place? What role do rational reasons play? What is rationality anyway, and where does it originate? What role does freedom play here, and how should it be defined? What is weakness of will, what role do temptations play?

These are questions that are important for many areas of philosophy (from philosophy of mind, philosophy of language and metaphysics to ethics and metaethics), but ultimately also for psychology and the interpretation of neuroscientific findings.

Exploratory readings:

Sarah K. Paul (2021), Philosophy of Action. A Contemporary Introduction. Routledge